Christopher M. Kaiser

Research

My research focuses on the industrial organization of labor markets, particularly union competition, monopsony power, and the effects of public policy. My methodological background spans structural modeling, demand estimation, and reduced-form causal inference. I am also interested in design-based statistical inference, particularly in settings where conventional asymptotic approximations may be unreliable.

Publications

Minimum Wage Laws and Job Search

Journal of Public Economics · 2026

With David Neumark , Vitor Melo , Liya Palagashvili , and Michael D. Farren

Abstract. Simple theoretical models of job search can imply that a higher minimum wage increases the number of job seekers for affected jobs. Researchers often appeal to these models in defending or explaining non-negative estimated employment effects of minimum wages. We use novel data on job search in U.S. states to examine the effect of minimum wage increases on the number of job seekers for low-skilled positions. We find little if any evidence that higher minimum wages increase job search for low-skilled jobs, and more evidence that higher minimum wages decrease the number of workers seeking employment in these jobs.

Published article

Assessing the Impact of Worker Reclassification: Employment Outcomes Post–California AB5

Mercatus Center Working Paper · 2024

With Liya Palagashvili , Paola A. Suarez , and Vitor Melo

Abstract. Using a difference-in-differences design, we assess the employment effects of California’s AB5 worker reclassification law by comparing nonexempt occupations in California with those in states whose classification rules remained unchanged. We estimate average declines of 10.5 percent in self-employment and 4.4 percent in overall employment, with no robust evidence of increased traditional employment. Declines were larger in occupations with a higher prevalence of self-employed workers.

Working paper

Work in progress

Markets for Worker Representation:
Evidence from Chile

Work in progress

With Sebastián Gallardo

Abstract. We study how competition among unions affects wages when multiple unions may represent workers within the same firm. Motivated by Chile's institutional setting, we develop a model of differentiated worker preferences, bilateral union--firm bargaining, and union entry financed by membership dues. Additional unions strengthen incentives to negotiate higher wages to attract future members, but fragment bargaining leverage by dividing workers across smaller organizations. The model characterizes these opposing forces and compares free entry with a policy allowing at most one union, as well as with the worker welfare maximizing number of unions. Our empirical work draws on Chilean firm surveys and union administrative records to describe worker representation markets and assess how these mechanisms can be taken to the data.